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NOTES
COMMON LAW METHODS OF CONSTRUING
A CIVIL LAW STATUTE
At 6:30 P. M. on April 27, 1942, the first torpedo struck
the Argentine merchantman Victoria as she plowed through the
night 360 miles from her destination, New York harbor. At
about 8:00 P.M. a second torpedo tore a twenty-five foot rent
in her stern. The Captain, believing the ship doomed, ordered
the crew to take to the life boats. During the night they lost
sight of the vessel. A little after 2:00 A.M. on the 18th, the
American destroyer Owl sighted the derelict Argentine ship, and
boarded her. Later on that day the Argentine crew was rescued
by the Owl. They returned voluntarily to the Victoria. Despite
the severe damage which the two torpedos had caused, the
original crew of the Victoria with substantial assistance from
the United States Navy, was able to bring the battered vessel
into New York harbor. Having brought the ship safely to port
her crew filed a salvage claim against her. The trial court
granted the claim on the following grounds: salvage claims are
governed by the jus gentium; under the jus gentium when the
crew is ordered to abandon ship, their contract of service with
the ship is terminated; the voyage ends when the captain orders
the crew to the life boats; at this time their duty to the ship
is voided; consequently, the crew having no obligation toward
the vessel, may return to her as strangers, and recover as
salvors for the part they have played in the rescue.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in an opinion by Judge Frank reversed the lower court.' The
jus gentium, according to the view taken by the upper court,
did not apply to the duty of the Argentine sailors to their ship
flying the Argentine flag. This relationship between vessel and
crew, and the resulting ability of the crew to qualify as salvors,
was governed by "the internal economy of the ship, by the
Argentine law, the law of the flag."' 2 "For us," Judge Frank
1. Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 (2nd Cir. 1949). A discussion
of the maritime questions involved is found in 28 CORNELL L. Q. 69 (1942).
2. BOUvIER, LAW DICrioNARY defines "jus gentium": "The law of
nations." It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss exactly where
the law of nations ends and the law of the flag begins. See: The Superior,
270 Fed. 283 (D.C. Cir. 1920); The City of Norwich, 279 Fed. 687, 691
(2nd Cir. 1922).
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continues "Argentine law is a fact. With respect to that fact
defendant had introduced the testimony of an expert witness."
This witness said that the Argentine Code created an objective
standard by which the termination of the contract between
the ship and the crew was governed. Before the crew was re-
lieved of its obligation to its ship a "shipwreck" was required.
The Victo7ia had actually to sink. The Captain's belief that
she was certain to go to the bottom was not sufficient to vitiate
the duty of the seamen to their craft. Consequently it could
not be said that they returned voluntarily from the life boats.
The witness concluded that the sailors could not be considered
salvors, and had no claim against the Victoia or her owners.
The upper court refused to accept the testimony of this wit-
ness, reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded
the case for a determination of Argentine law as to the con-
tractual duty of the crew to the ship. In refusing the testimony
of the witness the court was on sound ground. The witness
had never practiced in Argentina. To substantiate his opinion
the witness said he had searched the French Commentators on
the French Code, but he did not give specific references to enable
the court to search this source of information. In addition the
trial court expressed in the record its belief that the witness
was not reliable. After stating these valid reasons for its
refusal to accept the expert's opinion, the appellate court ii-
dulged at some length in two generalizations concerning the
nature of the civil law and its cannons of interpretation. The
court assumed (1) that civil law methods of interpretation
govern the approach to be followed by a common law court in
interpreting a civil statute (2) that the Argentine Code is
based upon the French Code. Both of these propositions are
sound, although the latter requires qualification.
First, the court reprimanded the witness for his failure to cite
Argentine cases. This omission, in the eyes of the court showed
that the witness had not searched the law on the statute before
with care, and was therefore not qualified to give an opinion
since, "despite conventional protestations to the contrary, much
law is judge made [in Civil Countries] and the courts are by no
means unaffected by judicial precedents or 'case law.' "3
3. 172 F.2d 434, 439 (2nd Cir. 1949).
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NOTES
Much has been written on the force of the case in Continental
law. The degree of importance given the case is directly related
to the writer's approach. From a theoretical standpoint the case
has little if any importance ;4 when measured on a practical
scale the case has greater weight.5 The question is: in analyzing
a legal system should we look to what the courts do; or to what
they say they do? On the theoretical level the place of the case
can be checked with accuracy. Its matrix was the Napoleonic
Code. Napoleon drove the case from France.6 In an attempt
to relegate judges to a simple, mechanical role, Napoleon for-
bade them to look beyond the words of the statute. The statute
was the sole evidence of the intent of the legislature. It was
the source of all law. Once created by the law makers the
statute was omnipotent and self-explanatory. Judicial discretion
was abrogated. The Judge had blinkers and he could neither
look to what previous judges had said, in like instances, nor
lay down a rule to bind future judges in similar cases. The
case was a nullity under the original code. However, under
the pressure of day to day litigation cracks appeared in Na-
poleon's scheme. Judges began to look to outside sources, com-
mentaries by eminent jurists, and history, both of the times and
of the particular statute, to aid them in their task of interpreta-
tion. Nevertheless, during the 19th century, the force of the
basic idea behind the code prevented courts, with one exception,
from referring to previous decisions. This rule finds expression
in the French Code, as amended in 1906 under Section 5 of
the Preliminary title: "Judges are forbidden, when giving
judgment in the cases which are brought before them, to lay
down general rules of conduct or decide a case by holding it was
governed by a previous decision C. 1351; F. 127) ."7 The above
Article has been briefly modified by the law of the 1st of April,
1837, which provides that if a case is twice brought to the
Court of Cassation on a particular point, and the decision of
the lower court quashed in both appeals, then all the chambers
of the Court of Cassation shall sit together and their decision
4. Ireland, Precedent's Place in Latin Law, 40 W. VA. L. Q. 115 (1934).
5. D~ak, The Place of the Case in Common and Civil Law, 8 TuLANE
L. REv. 337 (1934).
6. FRENCH JUDICIAL CODE, Art. 5.
7. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING, 125 (2nd ed. 1930); Henry Jurispru-
dence Constante and Stare Decisis Contrasted, 15 A.B.A.J. 12 (1929).
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on the specific point before the joint body shall bind the inferior
courts in like subsequent cases. The need for this article arose
when an inferior court refused three times to accept the ruling
of the Court of Cassation on a particular point of law. The
Article represents nothing more than a slight practical modifi-
cation. The one major exception is termed "jurisprudence fixeP"
or "constante." The law becomes fixed or constant when a
number of separate tribunals independently reach the same
result when presented with the same set of facts. After this has
occurred a sufficient number of times, later courts may pay
deference to their predecessors by reference to the series of de-
cisions. It must be remembred, however, that these later courts
are in no way bound by the prior holdings. Thus, until the be-
ginning of the 20th century the case was relatively powerless
in France. In contemporary times French Courts have been
forced away from their theoretical concepts. Floundering in
the complexities of modern civilization the courts have grasped
at any source which might enable them to reach wiser results.
Under the exigencies of the situation they have referred to
previous cases.8 This reference however is an aid. French
courts are still under no duty to give force to previous decisions.
Despite the breakdown of pristine Napoleonic theory, the case
remains a minor and relatively unimportant source of statutory
interpretation. In no sense is the modern French view to be
compared with stare decisis, or even the modern diluted form
of that concept. The terms "judge made" and "case law" sug-
gest such an analogy. In requiring the expert to cite Argentine
cases the court requires him to follow a procedure which, al-
though perfectly correct at common law where a prior judicial
determination has authoritative force, is nevertheless completely
foreign to the basic tenets of the civil law.
The final blow levied upon the expert witness by the court is
founded upon what the lower court may have thought. Judge
Frank says that the lower court probably knew that
the civilians influenced by an interpretive theory which
derives from Aristotle, are accustomed to interpret their
statutes equitably, i.e., to fill in gaps arising necessarily
from the generalized terms of many statutes, by asking
how the legislature would have dealt with the unprovided
8. WRIGHT, THE FRENCH CIL CODE ANNOTATED, 2 (1908).
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NOTES
case.. . . This attitude finds expression in Art. I of the
Swiss Code [of 1907] which directs the judge to decide as
if he were a legislator, when he finds himself faced with a
definite gap in the statute.,
The equity of the statute of which the court speaks finds its
roots in Aristotle and its fruit in such modern Americans as
L. Hand and Cardozo.1 It comes to us through the Roman law
and its virtue is reflected in Plowden's instructions on inter-
pretation." It did not, however, take root in Continental law
until most recent times. The concept is opposed to traditional
continental jurisprudence. The latter, as heretofore mentioned,
is grounded upon the Napoleonic belief in a sharply limited
judiciary. This Code postulate has as its corollary an assumption
that the legislature is capable of creating a code, the provisions
of which will be self-explanatory. The need for judicial inter-
pretation is non-existent. Judicial discretion from Napoleon's
viewpoint was dangerous due to the casuistry of individual
judges, and superfluous due to the ability of law makers to
embody their intent in the words of a statute. Aristotle on the
other hand postulated legislative inability to frame its intent
in bare words.12 The law makers could never predict the myriad
of determinants which might arise under a given statute. And
no matter how great their powers as careful draftsmen, they
could not foresee all the possible permutations which the prac-
tical application of the law would create. Therefore successful
administration of the law required original judicial placement
of the unforeseen determinate within the determinable created
by the legislator. Aristotle had faith in the judiciary, Napoleon
distrusted it. Aristotle gave it power, Napoleon made it an
automaton. The Swiss code does not epitomize the practice of
the civilians. It represents a radical departure from the tradi-
tional codes of civilian countries. In placing such a high degree
of power in the judiciary it stands as high-water mark in the
9. 172 F.2d 434, 441 (2nd Cir. 1949).
10. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Bk. V, Ch. X, 1137b; ARISTOTLE,
RHETORIC, Bk. I, Ch. XIII; L. Hand, How Far is a Judge Free in Render-
ing a Decision? I LAW SERIES, Lect. No. 14, National Advisory Council
on Radio in Education. (U. of Chi. Press, 1933) ; CARDozo, NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
11. Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowden 450, 465-467, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695-699
(1574).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, 276.
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continental trend toward increased judicial authority. This at-
titude, however, had not gained acceptance in France. It would
be safe to assume that the judicial climate in the Argentine,
especially when the latter's political atmosphere is taken into
account, is less liberal than that of France. The reference, by
the court, to the Swiss Code is unfortunate.
The common law puts former decisions in a position of highest
authority; the civil law grants the case, at best, a weak place
among the factors from which a judicial determination is
reached. Judge Frank has failed to recognize the relative em-
phasis placed by the two systems upon the case. Moreover, the
civil law itself is in a state of flux. The development of con-
tinental jurisprudence has reached different levels in different
states. As the evolutionary process has unfolded, the judiciary
has been allotted different degrees of importance; the value of
the case in separate countries has varied accordingly. The
court has failed to appreciate that the weight of a legal decision
is not the same in all continental legal systems.
FRANK M. MAYFIELD, JR.
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